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Abstract—In training their newly-developed malware detection
methods, researchers rely on threshold-based labeling strategies
that interpret the scan reports provided by online platforms, such
as VirusTotal. The dynamicity of this platform renders those
labeling strategies unsustainable over prolonged periods, which
leads to inaccurate labels. Using inaccurately labeled apps to train
and evaluate malware detection methods significantly undermines
the reliability of their results, leading to either dismissing oth-
erwise promising detection approaches or adopting intrinsically
inadequate ones. The infeasibility of generating accurate labels
via manual analysis and the lack of reliable alternatives force
researchers to utilize VirusTotal to label apps. In the paper,
we tackle this issue in two manners. Firstly, we reveal the aspects
of VirusTotal’s dynamicity and how they impact threshold-
based labeling strategies and provide actionable insights on how
to use these labeling strategies given VirusTotal’s dynamicity
reliably. Secondly, we motivate the implementation of alternative
platforms by (a) identifying VirusTotal limitations that such
platforms should avoid, and (b) proposing an architecture of how
such platforms can be constructed to mitigate VirusTotal’s
limitations.
Index Terms—Software Reliability; Android Security; Mal-
ware Detection; Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
The generation of reliable ground truths for malicious and
benign applications (hereafter apps) is fundamental for imple-
menting and evaluating effective malware detection methods.
Assigning apps inaccurate labels (e.g., labeling malicious apps
as benign) might impact the reliability of studies that inspect
trends adopted by malicious apps, and, more importantly,
might impede the development of effective detection methods
[1]–[4]. Manual analysis and labeling of apps is arguably the
most reliable method to label apps. However, it can neither
cope with the frequent release of malware nor the requirement
of some detection methods (e.g., Machine Learning (ML)-
based methods) of large numbers of labeled apps for train-
ing and validation. Consequently, researchers turn to online
platforms, such as VirusTotal [5], to label apps in their
datasets as malicious and benign.
VirusTotal does not label apps as malicious and benign.
Given the hash of an app or its executable, the platform
provides the scan results from about 60 different commercial
antiviral software [6]–[10]. So, it is up to the platform’s user
to decide upon strategies to interpret such information to label
apps as malicious and benign. Unfortunately, there are no
standard procedures for interpreting the scan results acquired
from VirusTotal to label apps, which leads researchers
to use their intuitions and adopt ad hoc threshold-based
strategies to label the apps in the datasets used to train and
evaluate their detection methods. In essence, threshold-based
labeling strategies deem an app as malicious if the number
of antiviral scanners labeling the apps as malicious meets a
certain threshold. For example, based on VirusTotal’s scan
reports, Li et al. labeled the apps in their Piggybacking dataset
as malicious if at least one scanner labeled them as malicious
[7], Pendlebury et al. labeled an app as malicious if four or
more scanners did so [11], and Wei et al. labeled apps in the
AMD dataset as malicious if 50% or more of the total scanners
labeled an app as such [9].
Some of the aforementioned threshold-based labeling strate-
gies may indeed accurately label apps better than others and
should be standardized. Nonetheless, researchers have found
VirusTotal to be dynamic in terms of the labels given by
the scanners it uses [3], [12], [13], which affects threshold-
based labeling strategies as follows. Threshold values that
used to yield the most accurate labels might change in the
future as VirusTotal changes the scanners it includes in
its scan reports. Using out-of-date or inaccurate thresholds
alters the distribution of malicious and benign apps in the
same dataset, effectively yielding different detection results
as revealed by recent results [11], [14]. On the one hand,
researchers might dismiss promising detection approaches,
because they underperform on a dataset that utilizes a labeling
strategy that does not reflect the true nature of the apps in the
dataset. On the other hand, developers of inadequate detection
methods might get a false sense of confidence in the detection
capabilities of their detection methods because they perform
well, albeit using an inaccurate labeling strategy [15], [16].
Until a more stable alternative to VirusTotal is in-
troduced, the research community will continue to use
VirusTotal to label apps using subjective thresholds.
So, the overarching objective of this paper is to pro-
vide the research community with actionable insights about
VirusTotal’s dynamicity, its limitations, and how to opti-
mally interpret its scan reports to label apps accurately using
threshold-based labeling strategies. To achieve this objective,
we focus on Android apps as a case study and utilize four
datasets of 53K Android malicious and benign apps. Further-
more, based on the identified limitations of VirusTotal, we
provide a blueprint for a platform that mitigates the limitations
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of VirusTotal and provides the research community with
a more stable, reliable alternative to VirusTotal.
The contributions of this paper, therefore, are:
• The dynamicity of VirusTotal is common knowledge
within the research community and has been mentioned in
previous research without, to the best of our knowledge,
being adequately discussed. In this paper, we reveal the
details of such dynamicity and how it manifests, how
it projects an improper image of the performance of
otherwise competent scanners, and how it undermines the
performance of threshold-based labeling strategies over
time (Section III-B).
• We provide the research community with actionable
insights about how to use threshold-based labeling strate-
gies to label Android apps in a manner that copes
with VirusTotal’s dynamicity and limitations (Sec-
tion III-C). We demonstrate that the optimal thresholds
that yield the best labeling accuracies change over time
and, hence, advise researchers to find the current optimal
threshold(s) to use prior to labeling apps in datasets they
use to train and evaluate malware detection methods.
• There are voices within the research community that
calls for the replacement of VirusTotal. However,
without a clear enumeration of the shortcomings of
VirusTotal, we risk implementing alternative label-
ing platforms that suffer from the same shortcomings
of VirusTotal. We identified four limitations of
VirusTotal that undermine its reliability and useful-
ness. Those limitations are (a) frequent inclusion and
exclusion of scanners in the scan reports of apps, (b)
using inadequate versions of scanners that are designed
to detect malicious apps for other platforms, (c) refraining
from frequently and automatically reanalyzing and re-
scanning apps, and (d) denying access to the history of
scan reports.
• Based on the identified limitations, we provide the com-
munity in Section IV with a blueprint of how to build al-
ternatives to VirusTotal that mitigate the platform’s
limitations.
II. PRELIMINARIES
To motivate the need for our paper and its line of research,
in this section, we give an example of how the dynamicity
of VirusTotal impacts the labeling accuracy of threshold-
based labeling strategies that are commonly used within the
research community. This example also demonstrates the
impact of inaccurate labeling on the reliability of malware
detection methods and their results. Based on this example,
we postulate research questions meant to reveal insights about
VirusTotal’s dynamicity and limitations and their impact
on the labeling accuracy of threshold-based labeling strategies.
A. Motivating Example
In this example we focus on ML-based detection methods
given their popularity within the academic community [8],
[10], [15], [17], [18]. Researchers devise new techniques to
extract features from Android apps and use those features
to train ML models. The trained models are evaluated by
assessing their abilities to recognize the malignancy of apps
not used during the training process (i.e., out-of-sample apps),
by deeming them as malicious or benign. This process requires
datasets of Android Android Package (APK) archives that
researchers often acquire from online repositories, such as
AndroZoo [19] or VirusTotal itself. To simulate this
process, we downloaded a random collection of 6,172 apps
developed in between 2018 and 2019 from AndroZoo. We refer
to this dataset as AndroZoo throughout this paper.
The acquired APK archives and their corresponding apps
need to be labeled either as malicious and benign or in terms of
the malware families and types they belong to [2], [9]. Since
manually analyzing thousands of apps is infeasible, researchers
usually download the scan reports of apps in their training
datasets from VirusTotal and label them according to some
labeling strategy they deem accurate. The features extracted
from the downloaded apps are used alongside their labels to
train ML models. As an example of an ML-based Android
malware detection method, we utilize a detection method that
is renowned in the research community and has been used
by different researchers as a benchmark [11], namely Drebin
[20]. In this example, we use different threshold-based labeling
strategies that have been utilized by researchers in the past, viz.
we use thresholds that deem any given app as malicious if the
number of scanners in its VirusTotal scan report deeming
it malicious (i.e., positives) is at least one scanner [7], four
scanners [3], [11], ten scanners [6], 50% of scanners (i.e.,
positives
total ≥ 50%) [9], and the strategy adopted by Arp et
al. in [20]1. We refer to those strategies as vt≥1, vt≥4,
vt≥10, vt≥50%, and drebin, respectively.
To test the ability of the trained Drebin classifiers to classify
out-of-sample apps accurately, we use two small datasets that
we refer to as Hand-Labeled2 and Hand-Labeled 20193. Both
datasets comprise 100 Android apps that were downloaded
from AndroZoo and manually analyzed and labeled, to acquire
reliable ground truth. The primary difference between both
datasets is that apps in the latter were developed in 2019.
Furthermore, we ensured that apps in both datasets do not
overlap with apps in the AndroZoo dataset.
In Figure 1, we plot the classification accuracy of the
Drebin classifiers whose feature vectors were labeled using
different threshold-based labeling strategies over a period of
four months. Each point on the X-axis refers to a point in
time in which we re-scanned all apps in the AndroZoo, Hand-
Labeled, and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets on VirusTotal,
downloaded their up-to-date scan reports, re-trained the Drebin
classifiers using all the different labeling strategies, and re-
tested the trained classifiers. We use the MCC score [21] to
1An app is deemed as malicious if at least two out of the following
ten VirusTotal scanners label it as such: AVG, Avira (formerly An-
tiVir), BitDefender, ClamAV, ESET-NOD32, F-Secure, Kaspersky,
McAfee, Panda, and Sophos.
2http://tiny.cc/95bhaz
3http://tiny.cc/a7bhaz
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Fig. 1: The Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) scores achieved by the Drebin classifiers labeled using different threshold-
/ML-based labeling strategies against the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset between July 5th, 2019 and November
8th, 2019.
represent the classification accuracy of the Drebin classifiers
instead of conventional metrics, such as accuracy [22], that
are unable to capture or penalize bias towards certain classes
in imbalanced datasets. The MCC values range from -1 (i.e.,
all apps were misclassified) to 1 (i.e., perfect classification),
with the value of 0 indicating a classification ability similar
to random classification.
We are not concerned with the absolute performance of the
Drebin classifiers. With this example, we wish to demonstrate
two issues. Firstly, despite all being utilized within previous
research efforts, it appears that some labeling strategies (e.g.,
vt≥4), contribute to training Drebin classifiers that generalize
better to out-of-sample Android apps than other strategies.
That is using the exact same feature set and ML algorithm,
different labeling strategies significantly alters the performance
of the same detection method, which leads to two different
answers to the question: Is the Drebin methods a reliable
Android malware detection method? A researcher that opts
to use the vt≥50% labeling strategy will deem the Drebin
method as unreliable and dismiss it, whereas one that uses
the vt≥4 strategy might deem it as potentially reliable and
continues to refine it. In general, having multiple perspectives
on the reliability of a detection method might either force
researchers to dismiss promising methods that underperform
during the evaluation, or adopt ones that are mediocre yet
perform well during the evaluation phase. Secondly, the MCC
scores of the Drebin classifiers appear to fluctuate from one
scan date to another, although they are merely two weeks apart.
So, depending on the scan date of the VirusTotal scan
reports used to label apps in the training and test datasets,
researchers might get different classification accuracies from
their detection methods. For example, during the period be-
tween September 13th, 2019, and October 11th, 2019, using
the labeling strategy vt≥1 led to training Drebin classifiers
that performed better than other labeling strategies on the
Hand-Labeled dataset.
B. Research Questions
In the previous example, we learned that some threshold-
based labeling strategies contribute to training ML models
that can classify out-of-sample Android apps more accurately,
despite the fact that all of the strategies that we used in the
example were devised by researchers and utilized within the
literature. Furthermore, we found that the labeling accuracy
of most labeling strategies seems to fluctuate over time,
due to some unknown aspect of VirusTotal’s dynamicity.
This fluctuation means that threshold-based labeling strate-
gies cannot be permanently and universally utilized to label
Android apps and train ML-based detection methods. In this
paper, as mentioned in Section I, we aim to provide the
research community with actionable insights about the impact
of VirusTotal’s dynamicity on the labeling strategies they
utilize to label Android apps used to train and evaluate their
malware detection methods, and how this dynamicity might
impact the reliability of their methods. We provide those
insights by (1) identifying the aspects of VirusTotal’s
dynamicity and how it manifests, (2) finding methods to
workaround such dynamicity given the lack of better alter-
native platforms to VirusTotal and the infeasibility of
manually-analyzing apps, (3) pinpointing the limitations of
VirusTotal that cannot be mitigated, and finally (4) using
the identified limitations to sketch a blueprint for a more
reliable alternative platform. We attempt to address these
issues by answering the following research questions:
RQ1 How does VirusTotal’s dynamicity impact the perfor-
mance of threshold-based labeling strategies?
RQ2 Which labeling strategy should be used to label apps
based on their VirusTotal scan reports accurately?
RQ3 What are the limitations of VirusTotal and how can
they be addressed?
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III. THRESHOLD-BASED LABELING STRATEGIES
A. Accuracy of Threshold-Based Labeling Strategies
In this section, we discuss the ability of different threshold-
based labeling strategies to accurately label apps in our test
datasets, namely Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019. Us-
ing the scan reports of apps in the aforementioned datasets
downloaded at different points in time, we label the apps
use different labeling strategies and compare them against the
ground truth we generated by manually analyzing those apps.
In addition to the labeling strategies we used in Section II-A,
we use all thresholds between one and ten scanners and the
threshold of 25% of scanners.
In Figure 2, we plot the performance of each labeling
strategy on the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets
between July 5th, 2019 and November 8th, 2019 in terms
of the MCC score. We attempted to gain access to the
VirusTotal scan reports of apps in both datasets that
pre-dates July. Unfortunately, access to such reports is not
available under academic licenses and requires the purchase of
costly commercial ones, which we consider the first limitation
of VirusTotal.
VirusTotal Limitation 1
VirusTotal does not grant access to academic researchers to
the history of scan reports of apps previously added and scanned
on the platform, even if such apps were added by the academic
community itself. In fact, we are not sure whether VirusTotal
keeps or discards the current scan reports of apps prior to rescanning
apps.
One can notice that some threshold-based labeling
strategies are more accurate than others over time. Starting
with the performance of vt≥1, while the labeling strategy
managed to achieve a decent MCC score on apps in the
Hand-Labeled dataset, its performance noticeably decreased
against apps in the newer Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset.
Low threshold values, such as one or two scanners, might
result in false positives, especially against new apps whose
VirusTotal scan reports are not mature enough. In
most cases, if an app has one or two VirusTotal
scanners deeming it as malicious, it is a case of a subjective
definition of malignancy. For example, we noticed that some
scanners such as Tencent consistently label any apps (e.g.,
ed23237e34ff47580a99ac70f35e84b32c05ab1d),
that utilize App Inventor4 as malicious apps belonging to the
A.gray.inventor.a malware family.
As for (vt≥50%), pushing the threshold that high might
prevent recently-developed malicious apps and apps that
belong to ambiguous malware types (e.g., Adware) from
being labeled as malicious, resulting in a high number of
false negatives. Similar to vt≥1, the older the app and its
VirusTotal scan report, the better the performance of
vt≥50% and the newer the app, the worse the performance,
especially since the malicious apps were not deemed labeled
4App Inventor is a visual programming environment maintained by MIT
that enables non-technical users to develop apps for Android [23].
by enough VirusTotal scanners to make the 50% mark re-
quired by the strategy to deem them as malicious successfully.
Another aspect of how the age of apps and, in turn, the
maturity of their VirusTotal scan reports impacts the
performance of different threshold-based labeling strategies
can be seen in the proximity of different MCC lines in
Figure 2. In particular, in Figure 2a, the lines of almost all
threshold-based labeling strategies are close to one another and
exhibit a relatively steady performance (i.e., the performance
does not noticeably fluctuate). However, the MCC lines in
Figure 2b are more distributed across the figure and exhibit
more fluctuations in performance. For example, on the Hand-
Labeled 2019 dataset, the MCC score of drebin sharply
decreased from a little above 0.3 on August 30th, 2019 to
almost 0.0 on September 13th, 2019 only to sharply increase to
around 0.45 two weeks later. The reason behind the proximity
in the case of apps in the Hand-Labeled dataset is that their
positives values are high enough to accommodate threshold
values up to at least 15 scanners, which is represented by the
vt≥25% labeling strategy. The novelty of malicious apps in
the Hand-Labeled 2019 means that their positives values are
much lower in comparison, which prevents thresholds higher
than six scanners from achieving high MCC scores.
To corroborate this argument, we calculated the mean,
median, and standard deviation of the positives attribute for
apps in both datasets over the same period of time. The results
in Figure 3 show that the positives attribute of malicious
apps in the Hand-Labeled dataset stays within the range of
15 to 20. Even with a standard deviation of ten scanners,
the range of scanners needed to label malicious apps in this
dataset correctly remains between 7 and 20 scanners. As for
the malicious apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset, their
positives values have mean and median values around seven,
ranging between 2.89 scanners and 10.91 scanners. The benign
apps in both datasets have mean and median values that are
almost zero with a negligible standard deviation of at most one
scanner. So, any threshold values above three are guaranteed
to avoid false positives resulting from deeming benign apps as
malicious. The aforementioned values of the positives attribute
allows the labeling strategies using thresholds between three
and six VirusTotal scanners (i.e., vt≥3, vt≥4, vt≥5,
and vt≥6), to outperform all other threshold-based labeling
strategies on both datasets in terms of the MCC.
What we can conclude from this measurement is that the
thresholds that result in decent labeling accuracy differ from
one dataset to another depending on one the age of apps
in the dataset and the maturity of their VirusTotal scan
reports. To generalize those thresholds to multiple datasets,
one must possess a diverse dataset that includes Android apps
of different ages, which is a concept we discuss in detail in
Section III-C.
B. Sensitivity to VirusTotal’s Dynamicity
In the previous section, despite finding that a range of
thresholds between three and six yields the best MCC scores
on the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets, we
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Fig. 2: The labeling accuracy of different threshold-based labeling strategies against apps in Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled
2019 datasets based on their VirusTotal scan reports downloaded between July 5th, 2019 and November 8th, 2019. Accuracy
is calculated in terms of the MCC of each labeling strategy.
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Fig. 3: The mean, standard deviation, and median of the positives attributed found in scan reports of apps in the Hand-Labeled
and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets between July 5th, 2019 and November 8th, 2019.
noticed that the performance of labeling strategies utilizing
these thresholds fluctuates at different points in time especially
against the latter dataset. This fluctuation is largely attributed
to VirusTotal’s dynamicity and the immaturity of the scan
reports of recently-developed Android apps. In this section,
we analyze (a) whether the reason behind such fluctuation is
indeed the dynamicity of VirusTotal, and (b) the aspects of
such dynamicity that cause this fluctuation. In this analysis, we
focus on the performance of threshold-based labeling strategies
on the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset on two dates, namely
September 27th, 2019 and November 8th, 2019.
We found that the labeling accuracy of threshold-based
labeling strategies using thresholds between three and six
on benign apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset did not
change, according to their specificity scores (TNN ). Focusing
on their performance on the malicious apps, we found that
they respectively had recall scores (TPP ) of 0.7, 0.6, and 0.6,
0.6 on November 8th, 2019 instead of 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, and 0.7
on September 27th, 2019. Since the total number of malicious
apps in this dataset is ten, we can investigate the differences
in positives values in their scan reports and the different
VirusTotal scanners that deemed them malicious on both
dates. In Table I, we detail the change in the positives values
in terms of the VirusTotal scanners that deemed the apps
as malicious which (a) were added to the scan reports on
November 8th, 2019, (b) were removed from the September
27th, 2019 scan reports, and (c) changed their verdicts between
both dates.
Three apps out of ten did not encounter any change in
their positives values. Nonetheless, one5 of these apps main-
tained the same value of positives because two VirusTotal
scanners changed their verdicts, namely Zillya changed its
verdict from benign to malicious and Trustlook changed
its verdict vice versa. However, VirusTotal contributed to
altering the performance of all labeling strategies by removing
scanners that correctly deemed two apps malicious from
their scan reports. In particular, the scanners ESET-NOD32,
Fortinet, and Ikarus were removed from one6 app’s
scan report, effectively reducing its positives value from five
on September 27th, 2019 to only three on November 8th,
2019; this prevented the vt≥4, vt≥5, and vt≥6 labeling
strategies from correctly deeming the app as malicious. The
same scanners along with Yandex were not included in the
57658f70ae6acccfa9f3e900f8ae689603cc19d0b
6bd97c85d38bd5bfc5e29b05b1a3a81b12949065a
5
TABLE I: The evolution of positives for apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset that we deemed malicious after manual analysis
and a detailed view of the VirusTotal scanners that were added/removed or changed their verdicts between September
27th, 2019 and November 8th, 2019 and how that affected the performance of vt≥3, vt≥4, vt≥5, and vt≥6. The check
mark (X) depicts whether the threshold-based labeling strategy managed to detect the malicious app on November 8th, 2019.
App’s SHA1 Hash
positives
(September 27th , 2019)
positives
(November 8th , 2019)
Added
Positives
Removed
Positives
Flipped to
Positive
Flipped to
Negative
v
t
≥
3
v
t
≥
4
v
t
≥
5
v
t
≥
6
8a9... 0 0 – – – –
bd9... 5 3 –
ESET-NOD32
Fortinet
Ikarus
Cyren – X
765... 7 7 – – Zillya Trustlook X X X X
5be... 12 13 Ikarus – – – X X X X
6da... 7 6 – – – Trustlook X X X X
c70... 13 13 – – Symantec Zoner X X X X
b9f... 10 12 Ikarus –
AegisLab
K7GW
McAfee X X X X
a0a... 8 11 Fortinet –
Zillya
Zoner
– X X X X
90e... 6 1 –
ESET-NOD32
Fortinet
Ikarus
Yandex
– Cyren
0d5... 1 1 – – – –
Recall 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.60
MCC 0.82 ≈0.76 ≈0.76 ≈ 0.76
second7 app’s November 8th, 2019 scan report, which brought
the value of positives from six to one, putting the app beyond
the reach of all of the three aforementioned strategies.
Unfortunately, we cannot identify the reasons behind
VirusTotal’s decision to alter the set of scanners it includes
in an app’s scan report. It is a puzzling fact that VirusTotal
added the Ikarus and Fortinet scanners to the scan
reports of some apps, whilst removing them from the reports of
others. The more confusing fact is that the removed scanners
contain the ESET-NOD32 scanner, which we found to have
correctly labeled the apps as malicious on September 27th,
2019. This seemingly haphazard inclusion and exclusion of
scanners within periods as small as two months contribute
to the frequent change of the currently optimal range of
thresholds. While such change does not impact older apps,
such as the ones in the Hand-Labeled dataset, its impact is
noticeable on newer apps, such as the ones in the Hand-
Labeled 2019 dataset. With this set of measurements, we
unveil the first limitation of VirusTotal, which has a
direct impact on the performance of threshold-based labeling
strategies, viz.:
VirusTotal Limitation 2
VirusTotal changes the set of scanners it includes in the scan
reports of apps over time by including and excluding the verdicts
of scanners regardless of the quality of those verdicts.
During this analysis, we noticed that the VirusTotal
version of some of the renowned scanners, such as
BitDefender and Panda, fail to recognize the malignancy
of any of the malicious apps in either dataset. Both of those
scanners continue to be given good reviews by users on the
Google Play marketplace and, more importantly, on platforms
that assess the effectiveness of antiviral software such as AV-
790e6ac481fdd497f152234f1cd5bec6d40f50037
Test [24]. VirusTotal states that the versions of scanners it
uses ”may differ from commercial off-the-shelf products. The
[antiviral software] company decides the particular settings
with which the engine should run in VirusTotal” [5]. In
fact, we found that the version used by VirusTotal’s for
BitDefender, for instance, is 7.2, whereas the versions
available on Google Play have codes between 3.3 and 3.6. The
7.2 version of BitDefender corresponds to a free edition
version developed for Windows-based malware that targets
older versions of Windows, such as Windows XP [25] and,
hence, is inadequate to use to detect Android malware. The
positive reputation that BitDefender has in the market
suggests that using its adequate version (i.e., the one that is
designed to detect Android malware), would yield a detection
performance better than the version on VirusTotal. To
verify this hypothesis, we downloaded and installed the latest
version of the BitDefender scanner from the Google Play
marketplace, installed it on an Android Virtual Device (AVD),
and used it to scan the malicious apps in both the Hand-
Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets. We also down-
loaded ten apps randomly sampled from the AMD [9] dataset
to test BitDefender’s accuracy. Unlike the results obtained
from VirusTotal that the scanner detected none of those
malicious apps, we found that BitDefender detects 56.5%
of the malicious apps in the Hand-Labeled dataset, 20% of
those in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset, and 70% of those
in the sampled AMD dataset. Figuring out the reason why
antiviral software companies opt to provide VirusTotal
with older, inadequate versions of their scanners is not in
the scope of this paper and, in fact, impossible to answer on
behalf of antiviral software companies. However, it leads us
to identify the third limitation of VirusTotal:
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VirusTotal Limitation 3
VirusTotal may replace the versions of scanners with inadequate
ones that are not designed to detect Android malware presumably
based on the request of the scanner’s vendor or managing firm.
C. Finding the Optimal Threshold
In the previous section, we found that VirusTotal
changes the set and versions of scanners it includes in the
scan reports of apps. This change impacts the long term
labeling accuracy of threshold-based labeling strategies. For
example, while the dynamicity of VirusTotal has caused
the MCC score of vt≥4 to decrease against the Hand-Labeled
2019 dataset from 0.89 to 0.76 (i.e., a decrease of 14.61%),
it did not have an impact on the MCC scores of vt≥2
yet caused the scores of vt≥1 to decrease. Effectively, the
previously-discussed aspects of VirusTotal’s dynamicity
cause threshold-based labeling strategies to trade places in
terms of the most accurate ones. In other words, at any
given moment in time, a (different) subset of threshold-
based labeling strategies will depict the most accurate labeling
strategies (i.e., optimal thresholds). So, before labeling apps
in their training and evaluation datasets, researchers must
identify the most accurate threshold(s) at that particular point
in time. Given a reference set of Android apps whose ground
truth is known, one straightforward method to identify the
currently accurate thresholds is to download the apps’ latest
VirusTotal scan reports, compare the labeling accuracy of
all thresholds between one and 60 (i.e., average total number of
scanners), and choose the thresholds that yield the best scores.
In this section, we investigate the feasibility of this brute force
approach to identify the optimal thresholds of VirusTotal
scanners at any point in time.
Algorithm 1 depicts a simple algorithm to find the current
optimal threshold of VirusTotal scanners that yields the
most accurate labels. To assess the quality of labels given
by different threshold-based labeling strategies, this algorithm
requires the presence of a dataset (A) of pre-labeled Android
malicious and benign apps. As mentioned earlier in this paper,
the most reliable ground truth (γ) can be generated using
manual analysis and labeling of apps. Without such a reliable
ground truth (γ) that acts as a reference to compare against,
one has to choose a subjective threshold (σ) that one believes
represents the nature of apps in (A) and use it as ground
truth (γσ) If so, the only threshold that would generate labels
mimicking (γσ) would be (σ) itself. Effectively, we end up
with the same problem we are attempting to avoid, namely that
of choosing subjective thresholds based on personal views.
Relying on manual analysis already introduces infeasibility
to the algorithm. However, assuming the existence of pre-
labeled apps, another problem arises. As discussed earlier,
the immaturity of newly-developed Android malware and the
dynamicity of VirusTotal lowers the values of the positives
attribute in the scan reports of those apps which, in turn,
lowers the thresholds needed to label them accurately. Without
access to newly-developed Android malware, researchers risk
Algorithm 1 An algorithm to find the current optimal thresh-
old of VirusTotal scanners to use in labeling Android apps.
1: procedure FINDCURRENTOPTIMALTHRESHOLD(A, γ)
2: tmpResults = {}
3: for all α ∈ A do
4: response = VirusTotal.rescanApp(α)
5: if response == True then
6: report = VirusTotal.downloadReport(α)
7: if report != Null then
8: positivesα = report[”positives”]
9: for all σ ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 60} do
10: if positivesα ≥ σ then
11: labelα = malicious
12: else
13: labelα = benign
14: tmpResults[vt≥ σ].append(labelα)
15:
16: bestThreshold = ””
17: bestScore = 0.0
18: for all σ ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 60} do
19: currentScore = calculateScore(tmpResults[vt≥ σ],
γ)
20: if currentScore ≥ bestScore then
21: bestScore = currentScore
22: bestThreshold = vt≥ σ
return bestThreshold, bestScore
choosing thresholds based on the scan reports of old malicious
apps, which are usually higher than the thresholds required to
detect new malware. For example, in Figure 2, if a researcher
only has access to the Hand-Labeled dataset, on October 11th,
2019, they might opt to use the drebin labeling strategy
because it exhibits stable performance of high MCC scores.
However, this labeling strategy will perform much worse on
newer apps in the Hand-Labeled 2019 dataset (i.e., it does not
generalize to newer malicious apps). Consequently, researchers
adopting this brute force approach to finding the currently
optimal thresholds need to continuously update their reference
datasets with newly-developed and discovered Android (mali-
cious) apps.
If the reference dataset (A) satisfies the previous condition,
identifying the currently optimal threshold can be performed
as follows. For each app in the dataset (α ∈ A), the latest scan
report of (α) needs to be acquired. Firstly, the user has to issue
a rescan request to VirusTotal, which takes around four
minutes to complete (line 5) As discussed earlier, this request
can be issued using the platform’s web interface or using the
Application Programming Interface (API) interface. In general,
under the academic license, a total of 20K requests can be
issued per day. So, depending on the size of the reference
dataset (A), the process of rescanning all apps might take
several days or even months. Furthermore, we recently were
forbidden from issuing this type of request using our academic
license. As of the date of writing this paper, we are unaware
of whether VirusTotal prevents academic licenses from
issuing this type of requests, or whether we are encountering
an individual technical difficulty. We consider the decision of
VirusTotal not to automatically and regularly rescan apps
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Fig. 4: An overview of the modules and operations of the
proposed VirusTotal replacement, Eleda.
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as another limitation of the platform:
VirusTotal Limitation 4
VirusTotal does not rescan the apps it possesses on a regular
basis and delegates this task to manual requests issued by its users.
One direct consequence of this decision is prolonging the process
of acquiring up-to-date scan reports of apps.
In line 7, after the rescan requests are completed, re-
searchers need to download the up-to-date scan reports from
VirusTotal. Similar to the rescan API requests, download
requests are limited to 20K requests per day, which might
add a few more days to the process. Between lines 8 and
23, the process becomes straightforward. Using thresholds (σ)
between one and 60, the labels of apps in (A) are calculated
and stored in a temporary structure under the key vt≥ σ (line
15). The stored labels are then compared against the ground
truth (γ), and a score is calculated, say MCC. The threshold-
based based strategy that yields the best score is returned to
the user.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO VIRUSTOTAL
In this section, we discuss how the limitations we discussed
above can be addressed upon building alternative platforms.
We do this by describing the architecture of a hypothetical
new platform, called Eleda8, that is designed to mitigate
VirusTotal’s limitations. An overview of Eleda’s modules
and operations can be seen in Figure 4.
Data Acquisition. The first operation of Eleda is to acquire
APK archives of Android malicious and benign apps to scan
and analyze (step (1)). AndroZoo [19] automates the pro-
cess of crawling different app marketplaces and continuously
downloads their APK archives. Access to such a platform is
granted to researchers via an API key that can be used to
download apps using cURL. Using this module, Eleda can
frequently query AndroZoo for newly-crawled and downloaded
apps, which is indicated using the looped arrow.
8Eleda is one of the mirror twins in Sharon Shinn’s novel The Truth-
Teller’s Tale, who is a truth-teller incapable of telling lies, earning her the
society’s trustworthiness. With Eleda’s proposed design, we aspire to provide
the research community with an alternative to VirusTotal that is more
stable and reliable.
Scanner Acquisition and Update. This module is re-
sponsible for analyzing and scanning the acquired apps. In
step (2), the module retrieves the names of antiviral scanners
and queries app marketplaces, such as Google Play, for their
latest versions. This list can be manually populated at first to
include the list of VirusTotal scanners that are designed
to detect Android malware and are available on Google Play.
As of March 2020, 38 (≈63%) out of around 60 scanners on
VirusTotal are available on Google Play. After download-
ing the latest version of each scanner in the list, Eleda updates
an AVD that is used to scan APK archives (step (3)). The
process of acquiring and updating new versions of antiviral
scanners from Google Play–and possibly third-party Android
app marketplaces–is meant to mitigate the third limitation of
VirusTotal, namely using inadequate scanners and scanner
versions not designed to scan Android apps. Moreover, using
a pre-populated list of scanners is meant to keep the set of
antiviral scanners used to scan APK archives constant (i.e.,
mitigating the second limitation).
App Scanning. To address the fourth limitation of
VirusTotal that it only re-scans Android apps upon re-
quest, in step (4), Eleda’s App Scanning module retrieves
the set of APK archives available in the platform’s app
repository, scans them using the AVDs set up by the Scanner
Acquisition and Update module, builds the latest scan reports
of those apps, and stores them in another repository (e.g.,
in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format). In order to
make the transition from VirusTotal to Eleda seamless,
the scan reports can contain the same information contained
in VirusTotal scan reports. For example, static information
about the app components can also be extracted using analysis
tools, such as Androguard [26], and the API calls issued by
the app during runtime can also be monitored and recorded
[27]. The frequency of the re-scan operation can be set by the
users of Eleda. Given that the platform is expected to store a
large number of APK archives, it need not re-scan all apps at
the same time. Instead, each app can be scanned every constant
interval (e.g., two weeks), starting from its initial acquisition
date.
User Interaction. The last operation of Eleda is user
interaction. In step (6), the platform receives a query from
a remote user in the format of a hash of an Android app’s
APK or the archive itself. If the app is not already in the
platform’s app repository, the App Scanning module can add
the app’s APK archive to the repository. The APK archive is
then scanned using the platform’s AVDs, and its scan report
can be displayed to the user. Eleda can mimic the design of
VirusTotal by offering users to interact with the platform
using a web-based interface or using API-requests. However,
to address VirusTotal’s first limitation, Eleda can provide
the users with all scan reports of the queried app.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the insights we gained from our
experiments, the limitations of our work, and how we (plan
to) address them.
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Aspects of VirusTotal’s dynamicity. In answer-
ing RQ1, we attempted to (a) reveal the aspects of
VirusTotal’s dynamicity that are not clearly documented
within the literature, and (b) study the impact of such dynam-
icity on the labeling performance of threshold-based labeling
strategies. In Section III-A, we found that VirusTotal
regularly manipulates the set of scanners it includes in the
scan reports of apps by adding/removing scanners from such
reports, including ones that correctly label the apps. This leads
to changing the number of scanners that deem an app as mali-
cious (i.e., positives), which is what threshold-based labeling
strategies hinge on to discern an app’s malignancy. While
this change has a negligible impact on the labels of benign
apps, we found that malicious apps–especially those recently
developed–suffer the most from this frequent manipulation of
scanners. So, to answer RQ1, the regular manipulation of scan
reports means that thresholds that proved to be accurate at one
point in time cannot be used over an extended period.
Optimally using VirusTotal to label apps. Given the
aforementioned dynamicity of VirusTotal, the concern of
RQ2 is to find a workaround for the platform’s dynamicity to
be able to label (Android) apps based on their scan reports.
We found in Section III-A that, at any point in time, there
are thresholds that provide the most accurate threshold-based
labeling strategies. So, instead of relying on a fixed threshold
to label apps (e.g., four scanners), for prolonged periods, re-
searchers should identify the current optimal thresholds based
on the latest scan reports of the apps they wish to label (i.e.,
after re-scanning the apps on VirusTotal). In Section III-C,
we propose an algorithm to identify such thresholds with the
help of a diverse, pre-labeled dataset of apps, and detail the
possible challenges that might face researchers adopting this
algorithm.
VirusTotal’s Limitations. The research community has
long aspired to replace VirusTotal with a more reliable
alternative. However, without pinpointing the shortcomings of
VirusTotal, we risk constructing a platform that suffers
from the same limitations. So, it is imperative to identify those
limitations, which is the concern of RQ3. In this paper, we
identified four limitations of VirusTotal that jeopardizes
its usefulness. First, the platform does not grant access to
the history of scans, effectively preventing researchers from
studying the performance of scanners over extended periods
of time. Second, the platform changes the set of scanners
it uses to scan the same apps over time, which undermines
the sustainability of threshold-based labeling strategies. Third,
the platform uses scanners or versions of scanners that are
not suitable to detect Android malware. Fourth, the platform
does not automatically re-scan apps and relies on manually
re-scanning apps either via its web-interface or via remote
API requests. In Section IV, we give an example of how such
limitations can be mitigated upon constructing an alternative
platform.
A. Limitations and Threats to Validity
Internal validity is concerned with actions or factors that
could influence our results. In this paper, we relied on ground
truth for the Hand-Labeled and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets
that were generated after manually analyzing their apps. The
intrinsic subjectivity of manually deeming apps as malicious
can threaten the reliability of this ground truth. In the process
of manually labeling apps in those two datasets, we comple-
mented our process of static and dynamic analysis of apps
with consulting the VirusTotal scan reports of those apps.
We opted to ignore the verdicts of VirusTotal’s scanners
vis-a`-vis the verdicts of a few apps that we clearly observed
their malicious behavior despite being labeled as benign by all
scanners. In fact, it is not uncommon for antiviral scanners to
be oblivious to the malignancy of malicious apps. For example,
over the past three years, we tracked the verdicts given by
VirusTotal scanners to a repackaged, malicious version9
of the K9 Mail open source app [28] that has been developed
by one of our students during a practical course. Despite
being a malicious app of type Ransom, the scanners continued
to unanimously deem the app as benign since February 8th,
2017, even after analyzing and re-scanning the app. Another
example is an app10 that we repackaged three years ago; the
app continued to be labeled as benign by all scanners until
only K7GW recognized the app’s malignancy in July 2019 and
labeled it as a Trojan.
External validity focuses on the possibility of generalizing
our results. There are two main aspects of generalization
in our case. Firstly, our results are confined to two small
datasets of Android apps. We chose to limit the size of our
datasets to ensure rigorous analysis of their codebases and
runtime behaviors in order to generate as reliable ground
truth as possible. To compensate for their small size, we
randomly downloaded 100 apps from AndroZoo that should
act as a random sample of Android apps without bias towards
malignancy, category, or marketplace. The second aspect
of generalization is the confinement to Android, which we
adopted as a case study in this paper. So, are our results
transferrable to other domains (e.g., Windows)? Concerning
the first and fourth limitations of VirusTotal, we found
that the platform implements the same policies regardless of
the domain researchers wish to focus on. As for the second
and third limitations, using ten randomly sampled Windows-
based malicious apps that we acquired from VirusTotal
(e.g., 11), we found that VirusTotal uses the same versions
of scanners for apps belonging to different domains. We
also found that VirusTotal changes the set of scanners it
includes in the apps’ scan reports at two different scan dates.
So, it seems that our insights might also generalize to domains
beyond Android.
9aa0d0f82c0a84b8dfc4ecda89a83f171cf675a9a
1066c16d79db25dc9d602617dae0485fa5ae6e54b2: A calculator app grafted
with a logic-based trigger that deletes user contacts only if the result of the
performed arithmetic operation is 50.
110b3beb60b80bba63154ab7491046528be0054e10
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Reliability validity is concerned with the possibility of
replicating our findings. To replicate our results using the same
datasets, we offer the scan reports of apps in the Hand-Labeled
and Hand-Labeled 2019 datasets, the Drebin feature vectors
used in Section II-A, and the tools we used to carry out our
measurements and experiments to the research community.
VI. RELATED WORK
We can categorize the insights and results of this paper
into two categories. Firstly, we study VirusTotal and its
dynamicity, detail how this dynamicity manifests itself, and
demonstrate how it impacts threshold-based labeling strategies
commonly used within the research community. Secondly,
based on our findings from studying VirusTotal, we at-
tempt provide the research community with actionable insights
about how to optimally utilize VirusTotal until a valid
alternative is implemented. In this context, we surveyed the
literature to find related work that fall under the categories
of (a) studying VirusTotal, and (b) using it for accurate
labeling.
Studying VirusTotal. The research community has
studied different aspects of VirusTotal and its scanners.
In [29], Mohaisen et al. inspected the relative performance
of VirusTotal scanners on a small sample of manually-
inspected and labeled Windows executables. The authors in-
troduced four criteria, called correctness, completeness, cov-
erage, and consistency, to assess the labeling capabilities
of VirusTotal scanners and demonstrated the danger of
relying on VirusTotal scanners that do not meet such
criteria. The main objective of this study is, therefore, to shed
light on the inconsistencies among VirusTotal scanners on
a small dataset. In [13], Mohaisen and Alrawi built on their
previous study and attempted to assess the detection rate, the
correctness of reported labels, and the consistency of detection
of VirusTotal scanners according to the aforementioned
four criteria. They showed that in order to obtain complete
and correct (i.e., in comparison to ground truth) labels from
VirusTotal, one needs to utilize multiple independent
scanners instead of hinging on one or a few of them. Similarly,
within the domain of Android malware, Hurier et al. studied
the scan reports of VirusTotal scanners to identify the lack
of consistency in labels assigned to the same app by different
scanners and proposed metrics to quantitatively describe such
inconsistencies [2]. More recently, Peng et al. [12] showed
that VirusTotal scanners exhibit similar inconsistencies
upon deeming Uniform Resource Locator (URL) as malicious
and benign. The authors also showed that some VirusTotal
scanners are more correct than others, which requires a
strategy to label such URLs that does not treat all scanners
equally. While these studies revealed inconsistencies in the
verdicts given by VirusTotal, they did not delve into
the possible reasons behind such inconsistences (i.e., whether
they are indeed due to the scanners’ incompetences or due
to VirusTotal’s dynamicity). In this paper, we build on
the insights in [2], [13], [29] to highlight the aspects of
VirusTotal’s dynamicity that impact the verdicts given by
scanners and how this impacts the performance of threshold-
based labeling strategies and, in turn, the reliability of malware
detection methods built on top of their labels.
Accurate Labeling Strategies. Aware of their sensitivity
to VirusTotal’s dynamicity, researchers have attempted to
replace threshold-based labeling strategies with more sophis-
ticated labeling strategies, primarily based on ML. In [4],
Kantchelian et al. used the VirusTotal scan reports of
around 280K binaries to build two ML-based techniques to
aggregate the results of multiple scanners into a single ground-
truth label for every binary. In the first technique, Kantchelian
et al. assume that the ground truth of an app (i.e., malicious
or benign), is unknown or hidden, making the problem of
estimating this ground truth is that of unsupervised learning.
Furthermore, they assumed that the verdicts of more consis-
tent, less erratic scanners are more likely to be correlated with
the correct, hidden ground truth than more erratic scanners.
Thus, more consistent scanners should have larger weights
associated with their verdicts. To estimate those weights and,
hence, devise an unsupervised ML-based labeling strategy, the
authors used an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm
based on a Bayesian model to estimate those models. The
second technique devised by Kantchelian et al. is a supervised
one based on regularized logistic regression. However, the
authors did not describe the nature of the features they use
to train such an algorithm. To devise an automated method
to label apps based on different verdicts given by antiviral
scanners, Sachdeva et al. [30] performed measurements to
determine the most correct VirusTotal scanners using scan
reports of a total of 5K malicious and benign apps. Using this
information, they assign a weight to each scanner that they
use to calculate a malignancy score for apps based on their
VirusTotal scan reports. Depending on manually-defined
thresholds, the authors use this score to assign a confidence
level of Safe, Suspicious, or Highly Suspicious to test apps.
The works in [4] and [30] seem to dismiss threshold-
based labeling strategies and go for sophisticated labeling
methods that may be difficult to comprehend and utilize.
In our paper, we studied the reasons behind the fluctuating
performance of this type of labeling strategies and found that,
despite their simplicity, they can be effectively utilized to
accurately label Android apps based on their VirusTotal
scan reports. Furthermore, we provide the research community
with an algorithm to workaround VirusTotal’s dynamicity
and yield the current optimal thresholds that would yield
accurate labels.
VII. CONCLUSION
The infeasibility of manually analyzing and labeling
Android apps and the lack of more stable alternatives
forces the research community to use the online platform,
VirusTotal, to label apps they use in training and evalu-
ating malware detection methods. Although VirusTotal is
known to be dynamic and volatile, previous research neither
delved into the aspects of the platform’s dynamicity, how it
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impacts the threshold-based labeling process, and how to work
around it nor implemented alternatives to VirusTotal.
With a focus on Android apps, in this paper, we studied
VirusTotal to identify how its alleged dynamicity mani-
fests itself and how it impacts threshold-based labeling strate-
gies that are widely-adopted within the research community.
Using our findings, we provided a method that bypasses the
aspects of VirusTotal’s dynamicity to find the thresholds
of scanners that would yield the best labeling accuracies and
more effective and reliable malware detection methods. De-
spite this method, we realize that VirusTotal’s limitations
ultimately calls for the replacement of the online platform
with more reliable alternatives. In order not to implement
alternative platforms that suffer from the same shortcom-
ings of VirusTotal, we discussed the four limitations of
VirusTotal that we identified through our measurements
and analysis and how to avoid them in building alternative
platforms.
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